Friday, November 27, 2020

How will the Indian Air Force manage to have 42 squadrons and by when...

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Source:-How will the Indian Air Force manage to have 42 squadrons and by when is it possible? Indian Air Force presently is going through its most difficult of the times where it will be retiring more aircraft than what it will be inducting causing imbalance in Squadron strength. Air Force currently operates 28 squadrons even though the sanctioned strength is 42. There is finally light at the end of the tunnel for the Indian Air Force (IAF), which is at its lowest point since the 1970s, with just 28 fighter squadrons operational against its authorized 42 squadrons. A senior IAF planner has told Business Standard that the squadron strength will not fall any lower. Starting from 2020, numbers will gradually rise. Three squadrons will be inducted this year, while only two squadrons would be withdrawn from operational service. First thing that we would like to clear out is that the need of 42 “combat” squadrons was coined many years back when the Indian Air Force’s major part of the fleet was 3rd generation fighters & 4th generation fighters like the Su-30MKI were gradually catching up. The 3rd generation fighters were designed to perform a single & focused role like interceptor (MiG-21), ground attack (Jaguar), close air support (MiG-27) etc. These different roles required separate specialist type of aircraft for each role which in turn increased the count of aircraft needed to fulfill all the roles. So if IAF really had all 3rd generation of fighters in its inventory, the organisation would really need as much as 42 combat squadrons for a two front war. But with changing times & the induction of more 4th & 4.5 generation aircraft in the IAF, the calculation of having 42 squadrons is practically changing. Unlike the 3rd generation aircraft, the newer generation of aircraft refer to what is called Multirole Combat aircraft. That means that a single aircraft can undertake various number of missions which earlier needed a lot of different mission specific aircraft. Since now one type of aircraft replaces several type of older aircraft, the count of total aircraft required to maintain the same level of aerial supremacy has decreased. For example: Su-30MKI – This is the backbone of the IAF. These are capable modern aircraft which can undertake roles like air superiority fighter, fighter-bomber, strike fighter, ground attack aircraft, interceptor, mini-AWACS, reconnaissance etc. Rafale – Just like the Flanker, the Rafale replaces 7 different types of aircraft roles. Hence it is also called “Omnirole fighter”. So now we don’t really need 42 combat squadrons. In best estimate, 30–35 combat squadrons of modern multirole combat aircraft are good enough for a two front war. IAF’s present strength is 30-odd combat squadrons but this includes a mix of many 3rd & 4th generation combat aircraft. Having said that, this is how are we accounting 30–35 squadrons in the coming years: Year 2021–2022: One squadron of Tejas Mk1 FOC variant is going to be inducted in 2021 in Sulur. The squadron is raised already but flies only one Tejas fighter. It’ll receive full strength in about one year after HAL resumes production post COVID-19. One squadron of MiG-29UPG multirole combat aircraft will be inducted & operationalised instantly in 2021. 12 of the Su-30MKI would be manufactured by HAL Nashik & inducted in the IAF by 2022. This, however won’t raise any extra squadron but will be a replacement for all the Su-30MKI crashed till date. Two Squadrons of Rafale will be operational by the end of 2022. IAF might order 36 units more at a far lesser price if it cancels the MRFA (MMRCA 2.0) deal. On a negative side, 7 squadrons of MiG-21 Bison will be phased out. Though 7 squadrons do sound like a huge number, but this means a count of 93 aircraft only as the Bison squadrons don’t have full strength. Year 2023–2028: Four or five squadrons of the LCA Tejas Mk1A will be inducted over a period of 6 years starting 2023. 83 of these single seat fighters (earlier split was 73 single seat + 10 trainer) will be inducted at 14–15 aircraft per year production rate. If IAF chooses to buy 36 more Rafale, they’ll be delivered by this time frame, adding 2 more squadrons. Year 2029 onwards MWF (Tejas Mk2) will have its first flight in 2022 & production would start in 2029. IAF’s long term vision is to have 10 squadrons or 200 of these aircraft over the next couple of years. This will replace the MiG-29UPG, Mirage 2000 & Jaguar after 2035. Year 2035 & beyond 6 squadrons of AMCA will begin to enter into service from 2035 as per IAF’s long term vision. The original timeline of the expected production is 2029 but considering the MWF program, a more realistic timeline is 2035. Now since the IAF has cancelled the ORCA, it might order 6 more squadrons of AMCA in a second batch of production. AMCA will gradually start replacing the Su-30MKI post 2040. These are the expected & realistic timelines of the upcoming fighters. According to this timeline, post 2030, we’ll have 30–35 combat squadrons in IAF. Noteworthy thing is these 35 combat squadrons will be of full strength & will have modern multirole combat aircraft except the Jaguars which will see their retirement during the same time. We don’t see any imports happening apart from the Rafale & most of the aircraft would be manufactured by HAL itself. In the upcoming years, HAL’s role will be limited to a lead integrator only & most of the assemblies & subassemblies will be made privately. Even today, many of the parts of Tejas like the wings are made by L&T & similar private firms. In future this contribution is expected to increase. If HAL decides to use the Nashik assembly line (which currently manufactures the Su-30MKI) to produce the AMCA alongside the MWF in the Bangalore assembly line, the rate of increase of combat squadrons will be much higher post 2030. Even if the Jaguars & gradually the Mirage 2000 & the MiG-29UPG are phased out during 2030–35, we’ll not see a dip in the combat squadron strength & it’ll be hover around a healthy number of 35 in worst case, which is a terrific number for modern multirole aircraft. Anything to assume post 2035 will be too long a shot to make. I hope this clears the air about the timelines of the IAF. These timelines are determined by HAL & IAF only & have been referenced from various sources on the internet. Source:- Subhadeep Paul Quora The post How will the Indian Air Force manage to have 42 squadrons and by when is it possible? appeared first on Indian Defence News.Indian Defence News - Defence Update Please Visit Our Site For Latest News On Indian Army, Navy and Airforce Indian Defence News.

Gagan Shakti-2018: LCA Tejas matching raw power with the Big Boys of the Indian...

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Source:-Gagan Shakti-2018: LCA Tejas matching raw power with the Big Boys of the Indian Air Force The Indian Air Force’s pan-India exercise Gagan Shakti-2018, for practising war-time drills witnessed the IAF pushing the limits of...

Debunking Some False Arguments about the LCA Tejas

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Source:-Debunking Some False Arguments about the LCA Tejas “The Tejas is an old design. It has taken 32 long years to develop! And despite being in development for so long, it’s not truly indigenous. It’s heart, the engine, is of foreign origin. So are its weapons and some avionics. Furthermore, it is so deficient in it’s performance, that the Indian Air Force (IAF) wants Rafales/Su-30MKIs/F-16s instead.”​ Every time the Tejas achieves some important milestone, these criticisms are repeated ad nauseum, in the popular media, on Twitter, on internet forums, and at bhel-puri stalls in Jhumritalaiyya. It’s infuriating to see an effort of this magnitude, one that has produced many successes, being panned time and again. So I’ve taken the liberty to put together this handy-dandy LCA Tejas mythbusting guide to counter them. And without wasting your time any further, I’ll jump right in False Argument 1: The Tejas is “late”. It has been under development for 32 years! The figure is technically true, but deprives the narrative of much-needed context. The Tejas’ origins can indeed be traced back to 1983, when the concept of a Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) was conceived. However, the IAF did not finalise its air staff requirements (ASRs) until 1985 (and kept on requesting major changes throughout the design and development phase, but more on that later) and initial funding did not come through until 1986. The project definition phase — the phase in which technical requirements are defined and a conceptual design prepared did not end until 1988. The final design was completed in 1990. Full funding was issued only in 1993, after which the development of a prototype commenced in earnest. Following several years of delay in the development process — delays that can at least partly be traced backto US sanctions on India following the 1998 nuclear tests — the Tejas had its first flight in 2001. From then, the project proceeded at a pace that is not too different that of comparable fighter aircraft development programmes worldwide. Consider this: the Tejas is slated to achieve final operational clearance (FOC), the stage at which an aircraft is considered fully ready for squadron service, in early 2016; fifteen years from the date of the first flight. At this time, the Tejas’ is expected to be ready to carry out every role required of it: beyond visual range (BVR) air-to-air combat, short-range dogfighting, and precision ground attack with a variety of guided and unguided weaponry. That compares well with contemporary fourth-generation fighters like the Eurofighter Typhoon and the JAS-39 Gripen. The Typhoon first flew in 1986. The definitive version with an AESA radar is still not in service today, 30 years down the line. The Tranche-2 version, which can drop precision bombs and fire BVR missiles, wasn’t available until 2008. Another European fighter, the Swedish Gripen-C, with full-spectrum capabilities, started entering service in 2002, also fourteen years after its first flight. The Tejas is about to FOC with all of these capabilities in late 2016. The fact that ADA managed to achieve similar or better timelines with the Tejas after its first flight, that too without the benefit of half a century of experience in building advanced fighters or the industrial ecosystem that enables such high-technology to proceed swiftly, is an achievement that is not given enough credit. False Argument 2: Because of the inordinate delays in development, the Tejas is now deficient. Just because the development was delayed doesn’t mean that the design is the same one from 1983. The IAF updated its requirements quite often and kept demanding additional capabilities of the design. It was a Catch-22 situation: the constant change in requirements kept the design up-to-date, but it also led to several years of delays because of the need to re-design, re-test, and re-certify the aircraft after every minor change. Off the top of my head, I can remember that the IAF demanded the following modifications pretty late into the program: Open avionics architecture , Precision bombing capabilities , Heavier A2A missiles (R-73 vs R-60) , Internal EW suite that included a self-protection jammer , Inflight refueling and More capable radar and missiles (LCA Mk-1A). With these modifications, the Tejas went from being a simple point-defence interceptor to a full-blown (albeit short-legged) multi-role fighter. False Argument 3: The LCA falls short on several performance parameters like empty weight, range, turn rates, etc. The IAF has allowed 53 concessions/permanent waivers in the design. First off, it is important to remember that the Tejas can carry out most of the tasks intended of it quite competently. It can fight other aircraft at beyond visual range (when equipped with an AESA radar and Derby/Derby-ER missiles, it could end up becoming the most capable BVR platform in IAF service. Better than the Su-30MKI and Mirage-2000). The addition of an Israeli helmet-mounted sight coupled to missiles whose seekers had a wide field of view (R-73 and Python IV/V) make it a fearsome dogfighter and compensate for minuscule shortfalls in aerodynamic performance. It can drop laser-guided bombs on ground targets with great precision. It is very easy to fly. In the words of the IAF, the fighter’s “control harmony is comparable to the best in the world… The intuitive cockpit layout and highly reliable life support systems provide for comfort as well as excellent situational awareness.” There are many such triumphs; too many, in fact, to recount here. Secondly, every fighter project concludes with specifications that aren’t met, or a few deficiencies in performance. It’s never that big of a roadblock to induction in service. And all said and done, 53 is a very small number as far as design concessions go; a pretty small portion of the entire range of capabilities. Even simpler aircraft (like the C-17) enter service with more deficiencies. These are either compensated with using technologies in other areas to offset performance shortfalls, or accepted in the interest of availability for combat. Again, I’ll go back to the Eurofighter Typhoon to illustrate my point. Remember I mentioned that it first flew in 1986? Twenty-two years later, it couldn’t independently drop a laser-guided bombon a target with any precision. Basic BVR combat capability was not available until Tranche 2 models were procured in 2008, 14 years after the first flight. Even in close air combat, its capabilities were decidedly limited. The helmet mounted sight (HMS) — a system that allows the pilot to cue weapons onto an enemy aircraft by simply turning his head and offers a quantum jump in dogfighting capabilities — did not enter service until 2010. The F-35 was hobbled by similar issues (and terrible program management) for several years. It didn’t begin to turn a corner until 2012 or so, after which it began rapidly demonstrating some of the capabilities that were expected of it. This all happened despite the likes of Boeing, EADS, and Lockheed in charge of these projects. How then do you expect the ADA, which has never developed a fighter in its entire existence, to deliver a more capable product before inducting any into operational service? Heck, even the IAF works with deficient designs all the time. They happily flew the short-legged, limited-payload Gnat and even procured it in great numbers. Ditto with the Su-7. The MiG-21, when initially inducted, was underwhelming. Its range was limited and its missiles didn’t work. The Bison is still riddled with issues. The Jaguar had a deficient nav-attack suite. It was practically useless in the long range strike until the IAF and HAL developed and implemented the DARIN upgrades. The MiG-27’s navigation system never worked well, and its reliability was terrible; at night especially, it was no better than dead weight. But none of this troubled the IAF. Why then is the LCA failing to achieve a handful design parameters something to raise a huge hue and cry about? ‘False Argument 4(a): The LCA isn’t really indigenous. Many of its subsystems are of foreign origin. But many more of its critical subsystems are of Indian origin too! The first one that comes to mind is the carbon-fibre composite airframe. It is a very high-tech product that reduces weight (thus permitting the carriage of a substantial external payload), aids maintenance, brings down manufacturing time, and so on. The fact that some of the technology involved has been exported to Airbus is a testament to its success. Another example is the digital fly-by-wire (FBW) system, developed from scratch by ADA scientists in India after their work, notes, and equipment was impounded by Lockheed Martin in 1998. No country on earth, none, has developed such a complex system and gotten it to work perfectly on the first try. How well does it work, you ask? Well, the system was first tested on an F-16XL in the US (this was before the nuclear tests). Much to the amusement of everyone involved, the software actually improved the handling qualities of the XL in several flight regimes! No wonder the IAF says that the Tejas one of the easiest and friendliest aircraft to fly. There are many other examples. The avionics. The mission computers. The navigation equipment, displays, and human-machine interface. The EW systems. This stuff isn’t trivial by any yardstick. Now coming to the foreign components aboard the aircraft. With the exception of the Americans, and to an extent the Russians, every country has used foreign subsystems extensively in its aircraft designs. The Gripenhas an American engine, a British airframe design, Swiss carbon-fibre, an Italian radar, an American flight control system, a cockpit with critical components purchased from Britain, etc. etc. This in spite of the Swedes having an industrial base that is far more advanced than India’s and extensive experience in the form of the Draken and Gripen. The Rafale and Typhoon both use American ejection seats. Their FBW uses actuators from Moog, an American company. The Russians were buying Damocles podsfor the Su-35s before the French stopped military exports after they invaded Crimea. Nearly every Chinese fighter in service today uses a Russian engine, a Russian ejection seat, and a slew of Russian weaponry. If these aircraft all qualify as “indigenous”, then surely the Tejas does too? The choice the design agency faces is quite stark: do they try to build every little component, thus reinventing the wheel at every step? Or do they use what is available easily in the market in the initial stages and then make an attempt to indigenise over the life-cycle of the product? The latter is always the more sensible way to go. In the final analysis, the Tejas is an aircraft that has been designed by Indians in India, and is tailored to Indian requirements. If that doesn’t make it indigenous, I don’t know what does. False Argument 4(b): Okay, I get that. But the aircraft’s very heart, it’s engine, is fully imported! Surely it’s an utter failure on that front? Yes and no. It has had a very protracted development cycle, and for good reason. A jet engine is arguably represents the pinnacle of modern technology, making it the most challenging system in the world to develop from scratch. It has to produce ungodly amounts of power for its size and operate at the very edge of what physics allows. The GE F404 — which ended up replacing the Kaveri on the LCA — weighs just a shade over 1000 kg and develops close to 80 kN of wet thrust. Assuming that it propels the LCA to Mach 0.9 at sea level (1,100 km/h), it’s developing about 24,400 kW or 32,700 hp. That’s 32 hp per kg. In contrast, a Formula-1 car engine generates “only” 8 or 9 hp per kg, and it’s about as far as you can get with piston engines. What does it take to generate so much power? You need critical components like turbine blade assemblies that see inlet temperatures of 1,400°C or so while being subject to extreme forces. A back-of-the envelope calculation using rectally extracted figures tells that a single high pressure turbine blade weighing 50 gm rotating at 16,000 RPM at the end of a 500 mm diameter disk will be subject to a centrifugal force of about 3,500 kgf. Imagine a two Honda Civics hanging off a tiny blade that is about as large as two of your fingers held together. Oh, and that’s not all. The 80 kN of thrust is distributed over the turbine blades, so there is a transverse load component as well. In order to sustain such loads, you need to use exotic materials and precision manufacturing techniques. Steel melts at about 1400°C, and starts rapidly losing strength at less than 500°C, so it’s obviously not an option. You need something like a nickel-based superalloy. And it can’t be simply cast or forged or machined into shape. It has to be produced via directional solidification or grown out of a single crystal in what looks more like a lab than a production shop. The shape, too, is extremely complex. It isn’t one solid piece — there are internal channels that route cold air taken from the compressor to the surface of the blade to keep it cool. And this is just the turbine. The fan, compressor, combustor, gearbox assemblies, bearings … they’re all just as complex. And they all have to be precision manufactured to ensure that microscopic imbalances don’t end up leading to excessive vibrations that could end up destroying the engine and the aircraft it propels. Then you have requirements like safety, fuel efficiency, minimum total technical life, and reliability that add multiple layers of complexity to the design. Now imagine the magnitude of effort required to develop something like this, with practically zero infrastructure and very little in terms of prior experience. And with skinflint bureaucrats refusing to approve requests for funding, test equipment, or manufacturing tools without documentation being submitted in triplicate and subject to audit after audit. Do you know how much the GTRE spent of developing the Kaveri? Rs. 2,000 crore, or approximately $640 million in equivalent US dollars (with all the exchange rate and inflation variations that happened between 1989 and now taken into account). Advanced nations spend billions on such programs, and they almost never develop clean-sheet designs. They’re always building on existing knowledge and existing designs. Consider for a moment what Jeff Immelt, the CEO of GE says. “If you could make something with 60 people in a garage, GE shouldn’t be doing it. But if you make a jet engine, there’s only like one and a half people in the world that can make a jet engine. And we are really good at that. If you want to compete with that, you’ve got to put yourself on a wayback machine and go back 25 years and invest $1 billion here for 25 years and then maybe, just maybe [emphasis mine], you’re going to be able to compete with us.” Think about that for a second. It requires 25 years. And a billion dollars. And then too, you’re more likely to fail than succeed. The Chinese have been pouring money and espionage resources into their jet engine development efforts (they have budgeted 300 billion yuan — about 45 billion in today’s US dollars — over the next 20 years on engine programs alone), and are still facing significant hurdles. Why do people feel that India would get significant results by spending just a few thousand crores? In any case, the Kaveri isn’t a complete write off. A naval derivative, the Kaveri Marine Gas Turbinemay end up powering Indian Navy vessels. It is also under consideration to power an Indian UAV. There are civilian spin-offs too. For example, Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL) now uses the investment casting technology developed by GTRE for manufacturing blades for gas turbines used in power generation. False Argument 5: In a globalised world, there is no point re-inventing the wheel. The IAF should simply dump it and buy the Gripen/F-16/MiG-35 What is true for cell phones or cars isn’t true for military equipment. In the long run, in peace and in war, the IAF is best served by procuring fighters designed and built in India. That’s the only way it will equip itself with a large fleet on a (relatively) small budget. There are other advantages to developing the technology in-house: less dependence on foreign suppliers, leading to increased strategic independence. Creation of a stronger local economy and industrial ecosystem. The freedom to tinker with the design and optimise it to suit local requirements without running afoul of IP agreements with the OEM. Spin-offs in the civilian world. And so on and so forth. And if going indigenous is indeed the way forward, then the IAF will have to live with fielding under-performing/problematic designs at the beginning. It will have to make peace with the fact that aerospace R&D is a slow, painful process that is fraught with risk. That’s how practically everyone else did it. The Chinese did not seek out the latest and greatest toy because their initial designs (Q-5, JH-7, J-8, J-10) failed to match up to what the US, Japan, and India fielded. If the J-10B and J-20 are flying today, it is only because the PLAAF and PLAN flew inferior aircraft for decades while their industrial capabilities matured. As it is, the Tejas program’s achievements have been quite impressive: the country has developed a fourth-generation fighter that is as good as the Gripen-C from scratch. It uses more home-grown technology than the Gripen does — including such critical subsystems like the digital FBW, the composite airframe, a large portion of the avionics, etc. Many of these have been applied to the IAF’s legacy aircraft as upgrade packages. To throw it all away because of a handful of challenges here and there or because Lockheed or Boeing are offering to transfer their manufacturing lines to India would be incredibly, utterly stupid. If the Tejas is cancelled, we will have a repeat of the same thirty-year saga the next time India tries to build her own fighter. Source:- Medium The post Debunking Some False Arguments about the LCA Tejas appeared first on Indian Defence News.Indian Defence News - Defence Update Please Visit Our Site For Latest News On Indian Army, Navy and Airforce Indian Defence News.

Debunking Some False Arguments about the LCA Tejas

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Source:-Debunking Some False Arguments about the LCA Tejas “The Tejas is an old design. It has taken 32 long years to develop! And despite being in development for so long, it’s not truly indigenous. It’s...

IAF commits to 324 Tejas fighters, provided a good Mark-II jet is delivered

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Source:-IAF commits to 324 Tejas fighters, provided a good Mark-II jet is delivered After years of being critical of the Tejas fighter, which is still not combat-ready 35 years after the light combat aircraft project...

Tejas to take off; F-16, Gripen ‘grounded’

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Source:-Tejas to take off; F-16, Gripen ‘grounded’ Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman has made it clear that her ministry will give a decisive push to the domestically-manufactured Tejas fighter plane for the Indian Air Force, which...

LCA Tejas Fighter Gets Big Push From Modi Govt, All Eyes On Action

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Source:-LCA Tejas Fighter Gets Big Push From Modi Govt, All Eyes On Action In what is being seen as a timely and hard show of support to India’s LCA Tejas light fighter program, Defence Minister...

Government Commits To New Variant Of Tejas Fighter, Future For Gripen And F-16 Unclear

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Source:-Government Commits To New Variant Of Tejas Fighter, Future For Gripen And F-16 Unclear In a clear sign that it may not be interested in acquiring either the Swedish made Gripen E/F fighter or the...

Why LCA Tejas should be the Best Choice of IAF in Warfare?

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Source:-Why LCA Tejas should be the Best Choice of IAF in Warfare? Tejas is a light 4++ generation war plane. It is designed to intercept and engage hostile jet and to perform combat air patrol,Surveillance,close air support, hitting enemy positions with precision guided ammunition in some cases as a deep penetration strike fighter. A multi role aircraft like Tejas can perform various types of role in war with a combat radius of 500 km. The 500 km combat radius includes 3 tons of weapom load and maintaining a height of 30,000 ft(the more altitude it gain its combat radius or fuel efficiency will increase subsequently or vice versa). The Tejas Mk.1A – is designed to correct many of the existing shortcomings in the FOC standard aircraft. Planned to be equipped with an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar and electronic warfare systems currently missing from the FOC standard Tejas Mk.1 The Tejas MK2 is an Major improvement over LCA Airforce Mk1 with higher thrust engine. This aircraft will have improved survivability, maintainability and obsolescence mitigation. Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Radar, Unified Electronic warfare Suite (UEWS) and On-Board Oxygen Generation System (OBOGS) are some of the state of the art technologies planned to be integrated. The cockpit design has been improved with bigger size, smart Multi function Displays (MFD) and smart Head Up Display (HUD). LCA Tejas Mk2 will come with longer combat radius. LCA Tejas are primarily tasked with interception, CAP and air defense roles, which means they will take off, engage the enemy, complete their mission and return quickly. Other times they will patrol assigned areas. Battlefield employment The IAF’s operational plans earlier had strike aircraft like Jaguars or MiG-27s attacking ground targets, while air defence fighters like the MiG-29 covered them from enemy aircraft. Now mission-specific aircraft are giving way to multi-role fighters, which can do both jobs. This doctrinal shift stemmed from the Mirage-2000, the IAF’s first multi-role fighter, which was inducted in the mid-1980s. The Mirage-2000 inspired the Tejas in both role and design. Today, the IAF controls the aerial battle from airborne early warning and command (AEW&C) aircraft like the Phalcon, a giant radar mounted on a transport aircraft. Flying over the battle space and scanning 400 kilometres on all sides, the AEW&C identifies enemy aircraft and, over a secure datalink, allocates fighters from nearby bases to tackle the intruders. The AEW&C also orders up fighters to strike ground targets in the land battle. “Tejas light fighters, located at forward airbases like Pathankot, Ambala, Sirsa or Jodhpur are ideal for missions in the vicinity of the border. They are close at hand and react quickly. Being far cheaper, they can be bought and used in larger numbers, saturating the enemy’s radar picture and complicating his decision-making,” says a senior former IAF planner. “With an AEW&C guiding the Tejas directly to the target, it does not need a long operating range; and its combination of Elta-2032 radar and air-to-air missiles, are lethal against most contemporary fighters.” Employing the Tejas for the tactical battle would allow the IAF’s heavy, multi-role fighters like the Su-30MKI and Rafale to be focused on targets deep inside enemy territory, which are beyond the range of the Tejas – such as major air bases, military headquarters and strategic infrastructure. These fighters, which carry far more fuel and weapons, can take off from bases deep inside India, bomb targets deep inside enemy territory, and also shoot down enemy fighters. Yet, heavy fighters have their downsides. Maintenance is complex, with half the Su-30MKI fleet usually unavailable for operations. Enemy radar picks up the heavy fighters more easily; the Tejas is smaller, and also stealthier, being largely fabricated from composite materials. Moreover, the loss of a Sukhoi-30 is a Rs 400 crore blow; a Tejas will probably costs one-third of that. Many IAF planners advocate a balanced air force, with a mix of light and heavy fighters. Light fighters like the Tejas would respond to the tactical battle, while heavier fighters, with their longer range and greater strike power, could tackle more strategic targets. Tejas role as a interceptor: In an Air to Air configuration Tejas can carry two R-73 and four Derby-ER missile along with a drop tank.With the help of quadruplex digital fly by wire and helmet mounted sight It will perform very well in within visual range engagement. With a Multi mode radar and Derby ER missile with a range of 100 km it has the capability to take out any hostile aircraft in beyond visual range engagement. Mark1A version will incorporate an AESA radar so in BVR combat its efficiency will increase. Tejas armed with Derby- ER and R-73 missile. Combat air patrol: During a conflict Tejas will carry out sorties to defend air bases from enemy raids. In an Air to Air configuration it will carry two R-73, two Derby-ER missile and two 800 litre drop tanks and it will achieve a endurance of 1 hour 24 minutes without any in flight refueling. Surveillance : Tejas armed with AN/AAQ-28(V) Litening targeting pod will be able to monitor ground targets or enemy movement. It can also be used as a secondary armed reconnaissance fighter. The litening pod included a forward looking high resolution infra red camera Lightening pod LITENING significantly increases the combat effectiveness of the aircraft during day, night and under-the-weather conditions in the attack of ground and air targets with a variety of standoff weapons (i.e., laser-guided bombs, conventional bombs and GPS-guided weapons). LITENING is an integrated targeting pod that mounts externally to the aircraft. The targeting pod contains a high-resolution, forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensor that displays an infrared image of the target to the aircrew; it has a wide field of view search capability and a narrow field of view acquisition/targeting capability of battlefield-sized targets. Tejas armed with GBU-16 Paveway II Tejas will hit its target with pin point accuracy with laser guided bomb. Air force will deploy it to destroy well fortified enemy bunkers and hostile artilary positions. Tejas role in Hitting enemy positions: Apart from laser guided bomb Tejas can also carry 500kg gravity boms. Tejas armed with four 500kg FAB-500M bomb In a bombing configuration Tejas will carry four 500kg bomb, two R-73 missile, one targeting pod and one drop tank. It can be operated from forward landing bases of western sector or eastern sector to hit hostile infrastructure, ammunition depot or airfield. Its advance cockpit will allow it to hit targets with precision. Tejas role as a deep penetration strike fighter : Tejas armed with two R-73 missile, two 500Kg bomb,Litening targetting pod and two drop tanks. In a strike configuration Tejas will carry two R-73 missile, three high explosive 500kg bombs, litening pod and two drop tanks for deep penetration strike.Its superior multi mode radar will allow it to engage ground and air targets simultaneously.Tejas will also have a Inflight refueling probe which will increase its combat radius to nearly 800+ km. Through buddy refueling process it can stay in the air for longer period of time. This Post is been Copied From Quora Written By Uttam Mahatta The post Why LCA Tejas should be the Best Choice of IAF in Warfare? appeared first on Indian Defence News.Indian Defence News - Defence Update Please Visit Our Site For Latest News On Indian Army, Navy and Airforce Indian Defence News.

Why LCA Tejas should be the Best Choice of IAF in Warfare?

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Source:-Why LCA Tejas should be the Best Choice of IAF in Warfare? Tejas is a light 4++ generation war plane. It is designed to intercept and engage hostile jet and to perform combat air patrol,Surveillance,close...